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![]() | Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone by Larry Devlin ISBN-10: 9781586484057 ISBN-10: 1-58648-405-2 ISBN-13: 9781586484057 ISBN-13: 978-1-58648-405-7 Hardcover 2007-03-12 PublicAffairs Find Lowest Price | |
Editorials | ||
Product Description Larry Devlin arrived as the new chief of station for the CIA in the Congo five days after the country had declared its independence, the army had mutinied, and governmental authority had collapsed. As he crossed the Congo River in an almost empty ferry boat, all he could see were lines of people trying to travel the other way—out of the Congo. Within his first two weeks he found himself on the wrong end of a revolver as militiamen played Russian-roulette, Congo style, with him. During his first year, the charismatic and reckless political leader, Patrice Lumumba, was murdered and Devlin was widely thought to have been entrusted with (he was) and to have carried out (he didn't) the assassination. Then he saved the life of Joseph Desire Mobutu, who carried out the military coup that presaged his own rise to political power. Devlin found himself at the heart of Africa, fighting for the future of perhaps the most strategically influential country on the continent, its borders shared with eight other nations. He met every significant political figure, from presidents to mercenaries, as he took the Cold War to one of the world's hottest zones. This is a classic political memoir from a master spy who lived in wildly dramatic times. | ||
Reviews | ||
Keep In Context And Consider The Source This memoir by the man who was CIA station chief at the birth of the modern Congo can spark reactions from repulsion to admiration for the man, his mission, and the many, many less-than-perfect players in the game at the time. Although any such work needs to be read with a grain of salt and full recognizance that the author isn't about to destroy his own reputation, Devlin's book is, I think, an accurate account of the events of the times. His no-holds-barred discussion of Patrice Lumumba is bound to provoke cries of outrage in many circles, but Devlin is not alone in his assessment of the problems caused by the personal strengths, weaknesses, and ambitions of the martyred Congolese patriot. I heartily recommend this book for the insights it offers into the wild times leading up to the Mobutu coup. Dave Donelson, author of Heart of Diamonds: A Novel of Scandal, Love and Death in the Congo | ||
The Way It Was -- Honest & Unvarnished This is a great book of how one man can could make a difference in the Cold War. Author Devlin chose to concentrate on his time as the CIA Station Chief in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early and mid 1960s but one suspects that his earlier time as a case officer (in an unstated country) and later as station chief in Laos might be equally enlightening. Devlin did his job to the best of his ability, acting always in the interest of the United States, and sometimes taking enormous risks with his career in the Agency and even his and his family's personal safety. Unfortunately this is an example of a bygone era, probably never to be repeated since the Agency has become increasingly bureaucratic and bureaupathic over the years. Devlin enjoyed a great deal of latitude and authority, much more than is allowed today, recommending to Langley what should be done (and doing it either before or after approval) rather than to sit and wait on directives. Such behavior is unthinkable today, and as a result the CIA's HUMINT is currently almost non-existent. Having read the other reviews I was struck by several who criticized Devlin on political grounds, but it was Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and other various people above him who made policy rather than Devlin himself. He was simply extremely effective in carrying out their policies, and for that he should be commended rather than criticized. In addition, the times were much different in the 60s, and the Cold War was threatening to become hot in many locations. The UN was its usual ineffective self, and this book clearly points up the problems of attempting to depend on a toothless tiger to maintain order. Even worse, the UN frequently acts in opposition to American wishes as it did in this book. American politicians, such as G. Mennon Williams, unknowledgable and dabbling in foreign affairs come off less than effective in Devlin's work, as do many State Department officials. Devlin's main effort was to forestall Soviet expansion into Africa and the Congo rather than create a democracy in Zaire, and that must be kept in mind. He dealt with the Congolese as they were, not as how he would like them to be (ala Jimmy Carter.) His depictions of personalities, both favorable and unfavorable may offend many, but inconvenient truths are still truths. Devlin recounts the problems with Patrice Lumumba and the various successor governments until the Mobutu coup and the civil war in the mid 1960s. The CIA was in the thick of it, advising but not controlling the Congolese politicians, and always attempting to keep the Sov Bloc nations out. How Devlin did this, and his successes and failures, make fascinating reading. His motivation (as he states it) was to keep the cold war from becoming hot by frustrating communist expansionism and influence in non-communist countries. This is a period piece illuminating the operational CIA at its best working to further American interests and safeguard the US from its enemies. During this period the Agency actively combatted Soviet thrusts on all fronts rather than merely supplying intelligence for actions by others. In many respects the Agency was the US's first line of defense, often acting to make up for ineffective diplomatic initiatives, unknown and unappreciated by the American political establishment and the public. Read how it was done, and they ask yourself if you are willing to do what Devlin did in the future. It will take many Devlins to keep the US secure for our children. A whole lot more action than talk is necessary. Also note that Devlin was on duty 24-7 most of the time rather than 9-5. Like I said, it was a different age. Buy and read this very well-written and interesting memoir by one who was there. It may be self-serving to some degree, but certainly less than most memoirs, and is worth a read by anyone interested in the CIA or US intelligence. John Le Carre could not have done better. | ||
Great personal experiences, but not the best wordsmith It's worth a read, however, I still felt like he left a lot of the inner workings of a CIA station unremarked. His personal dangers and bravery in the face of them are honorable and America should be grateful we had him to care for things in the Congo during that crucial time. However, I still feel unsatisfied with the book somehow, and it did drag in some places. | ||
In the dark at the time I was a teacher in the mid 1960s at a Tanzanian school of social science and for adult Tanzanians who were moving into mainly mid level leadership roles in the country. I was sent there by an undergraduate volunteer group from Harvard that looked for funding from various sources, one or two of which were probably conduits for CIA or closely related money, though our understanding of where the money came from was vague then, and still is now as far as I know (and of course we didn't see that where some of the money came from necessarily affected what we did as volunteers). For me, Devlin's book is an interesting fleshing-out of what must have been going on generally in Africa while I was there, to which I and most other volunteers I knew were largely oblivious. The book certainly bears out that the left in the 60s was correct in being paranoid about the CIA. It's nice to hear now that the CIA didn't actually assassinate Lumumba, but of course the book implies that President Eisenhower and others in high places were most likely also commissioning other assassinations of democratic leaders as well, as they did in Lumumba's case even if the orders were resisted by people at Devlin's level. Devlin's positive portrait of Mobutu surprised me and makes me want to think again about how we so easily label people like him as monsters because they ultimately end up as dictators, partly thanks to us. After finishing the book I'm inclined to suspect that the world would not have turned out worse if the socialist countries had gained as much power in the sub-Saharan Africa as the capitalist ones held there throughout the last half of the 20th century. Who knows, but maybe more infrastructure would have survived. And of course, what a much greater headache Africa (like Afghanistan) would have turned out to be for the USSR. | ||
Chief Of Station CIA The Congo This book arrived quicker than I thought. We are planning to move and I thought this book would not make it in time for our move. It came as almost a brand new book and after I read it will ad it to all my books on Africa. Thank you seller for this good looking book! | ||