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 | | Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy by Mark M. Lowenthal ISBN-10: 9780872896000 ISBN-10: 0-87289-600-5 ISBN-13: 9780872896000 ISBN-13: 978-0-87289-600-0 Paperback 2008-10-21 CQ Press Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Product Description Intelligence veteran Mark M. Lowenthal details how the intelligence community's history, structure, procedures, and functions affect policy decisions. With his friendly prose, he demystifies a complicated and complex process. Rich with examples and anecdotes, Intelligence also includes bolded key terms, an acronym list, suggested readings and websites, and a list of major intelligence reviews or proposals. This new, fully-updated fourth edition highlights many crucial recent developments in reforms, ethics, and transnational issues, including: -the actual implementation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reforms and their successes and strains; | ||
Reviews | ||
Great introduction for newcomers and reminder for old hands I was an Air Force military intelligence officer in the late 1990s. I've been working in computer security since then. I read Intelligence, 4th Ed (I4E) to determine if I could recommend this book to those who doubt or don't understand the US intelligence community (IC). I am very pleased to say that I4E is an excellent book for those with little to no intelligence experience. I also found I4E to be a great way to catch up on changes in the IC, particularly since Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Mark Lowenthal struck me as an author who really understands the IC. When I read his descriptions of MASINT not being appreciated (p 96), the institutional bias against open source intelligence (p 105), and related cultural issues, I thought he offered a view of the IC not found in other sources. His explanations of friction between agencies, between various Congressional oversight committees, and between branches of government were very enlightening. The interests and bias of each party were interesting; for example, Congress (like Chief Information or Technology Officers) likes to buy new tech (satellites, etc.) instead of investing in analysts! I appreciated his description of the importance of Congressional authorizers vs appropriators, and how those duties affect the IC budget. I4E really frames IC issues in a way that makes sense to the reader. For example, p 2 says "Intelligence agencies exist for at least four major reasons: to avoid strategic surprise; to provide long-term expertise; to support the policy process; and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods." He explains that while Pearl Harbor was a strategic surprise, 9/11 was a tactical surprise. On p 1 he explains that "Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information; not all information is intelligence." In Ch 4 he describes the seven phases of the intelligence process as 1) identifying requirements, 2) collection, 3) processing and exploitation, 4) analysis and production, 5) dissemination, 6) consumption, and 7) feedback. He emphasizes that professional intelligence officers do not offer policy recommendations. The two questions one must ask of new intelligence officers are 1) do they think interesting thoughts and 2) do they write well (pp 118-119). Good intelligence is timely, tailored, digestible, and clear, with objectivity assumed (p 147). On p 148 he makes the case that "the 'big things' tend to be the hardest to foresee for the very reason that they run counter to all of that accumulated intelligence," and on p 167 he says government actors tend to have "an inability to use historical examples. Decision makers are so accustomed to concentrating on near-term issues that they tend not to remember accurately past analogous situations in which they have been involved... they learn somewhat false lessons from the past, which are then misapplied to new circumstances." I also liked his discussion of the "capabilities vs intentions" debate, where he differentiates between those who worry about parties because of what they can do, vs those who worry about parties because of what they want to do. Despite being a book on intelligence, the author manages to transmit a really dry sense of humor -- if you know where to look. For example, p 107 features Table 5-1 comparing advantages and disadvantages of various collection disciplines. SIGINT lists "voluminous material" as an advantage, and "voluminous material" as a disadvantage. Both are true, which is a subtle joke. Finally, the author shares some really helpful insights regarding the two biggest intelligence issues of the last decade: 9/11 and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. On pp 310-311 he says the following: "Both of these events have entered into popular legend as to the mistakes that were made and the necessary fixes. However, a critical examination of the 'received' lessons of these two events... reveals that they are almost diametrically opposed. - Warning: The lesson of September 11 is to warn as stridently as possible to make sure that policy makers comprehend the gravity of the situation. But the lesson of Iraq WMD is to warn only when you are absolutely certain that the situation is real. You can warn extravagantly or cautiously but not both. - Information sharing: The lesson of September 11 is that intelligence must be shared broadly across the intelligence community so that necessary connections can be made. But the lesson of Iraq WMD is to be careful and not share information that is dubious, such as the discredited reporting of the human source known as CURVEBALL. - 'Connect the dots': If we overlook the inappropriate relationship of this phrase to the work of intelligence, for the moment, we see that the lesson of September 11 is the need to connect the dots. But the lesson of Iraq WMD is not to connect too many dots and create a false picture." Well said! Anyone interested in learning about the IC and how professional intelligence officers think and act will enjoy reading I4E. Great work! | ||
Excellent text book Lowenthal's book is an ideal intro to the intelligence community and the overly-complex mess that it is. He makes sense of it and organizes his work perfectly for students. However, his "Key Terms" selections seem rather arbitrary at times. Oh well! Excellent work! | ||
wet book Unfortunately, we were unable to read this book because it was delivered wet with the pages stuck together. We have since returned the book and are awaiting a refund. Regards, Jonathan Fairbanks | ||
An Introduction to American Intelligence... Mark Lowenthal, a long-time veteran of the Intelligence Community, is the author of "Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy," a superb introduction into the American Intelligence Community and its transition from the long Cold War against the Soviets to the current battles against rogues states and transnational terrorists. Lowenthal writes at the survey level for an audience with a general understanding of American history and governmental processes but limited knowledge of how intelligence fits into either. In sequencial steps, Lowenthal explains what intelligence is supposed to be, how U.S. intelligence developed, and how the Intelligence Community operates. He reviews the intelligence process, the major collection disciplines, and the moving parts of subcomponents such as analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. The last chapters explore the difficult issues of interaction with policy-makers, oversight, and transformation. Lowenthal's narrative is remarkable on at least two counts. He appreciates just how challenging it is to produce timely, accurate, and useful intelligence, and he is exceptionally even-handed in describing all the things that can go right or wrong in the process. While no one topic is covered in significant depth, his coverage of the whole is very solid and perfectly suited to entry-level classes on intelligence and its interaction with policy. A nice selection of anecdotes and examples help provide depth to what might otherwise turn into dry narrative. "Intelligence: From Secrets To Policy" is very highly recommended as an introduction to the intelligence business for use at the collegiate level and for the general reader. | ||
A very good primer on US intelligence This is a very good primer on US intelligence. It is the 3rd edition. We used this book as a core reading material for US policy and intelligence course | ||