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 | | Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did by Loren Baritz ISBN-10: 9780801859533 ISBN-10: 0-8018-5953-0 ISBN-13: 9780801859533 ISBN-13: 978-0-8018-5953-3 Paperback 1998-06-03 The Johns Hopkins University Press Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Product Description In a probing look at the myths of American culture that led us into the Vietnam quagmire, Loren Baritz exposes our national illusions: the conviction of our moral supremacy, our assumption that Americans are more idealistic than other people, and our faith in a technology that supposedly makes us invincible. He also reveals how Vietnam changed American culture today, from the successes and failures of the Washington bureaucracy to the destruction of the traditional military code of honor. | ||
Reviews | ||
Excellent book for behind the scenes of Vietnam A great book for an in-depth look at what went on in Washington and the influence of American culture in how we fought in Vietnam. Baritz thoroughly describes the state of mind America was in at the time of the war and the greedy beauracrats in Washington. Baritz also focuses on the myths of American culture that led us into the war and the myths that made us think that winning was possible and inevitable. A false sense of hope about the war and cover-ups were planted in the American public. Overall, this book has changed my view on American culture and politics and the corruption that is never addressed to the public. | ||
Review of Vietnam, Preview of Iraq I read this book before the US invasion of Iraq after reading an article in 2002 by Philip Gold, a Seattle-area conservative, who spoke highly of it. He believed the US was going to end up repeating its mistakes in Vietnam, for similar reasons. He was right. I'll list just one example: the myth that technology is a panacea, and a substitute for troops on the ground. Donald Rumsfeld appeared to believe that he had discovered a revolutionary breakthrough that would allow for an easy victory in Iraq, one no one had ever thought of before. In fact, he'd just fallen for the same exact myth as the planners of the Vietnam War, for the same reasons. Numerous other comparisons can be made reading this book. It's not a moral critique of the war, but rather a chronicle of bureaucratic disaster, and a blueprint for what was to come. | ||
Plus ca change . . . .Americans just don't get it Every politician should read Loren Baritz's analysis of the delusional thinking that got us into the Vietnam quaqmire. It bears directly on how we got ourselves into the Iraq War. Loren Baritz describes the complete ignorance of foreign cultures, the complete inability to predict consequences, of the presidents, politicians, and military commanders who dragged us into a no-win war with "north" Vietnam. In his preface Baritz says: "The war presidents beieved in what they were doing. I have no doubt they were sincere. Victims of Cold War jitters, they meant to curtail the spread of communism. With deep-seated American idealism, they intended to engineer a more sanitary and more democratic Vietnam. LBJ desperately wanted to "win their hearts and minds," and Nixon described the war as a "noble cause." They wanted to save the Vietnamese, sometimes from themselves, always from their ideologically crazed brothers. Our sense of moral superiority to the rest of the world, our missionary compulsion, is a story as old as the settlement of America. . . Our commanders lusted for a massive conventional battle . . . [but] There was never a front line -- never any line at all -- and no territory to be won and held. The Vietcong looked exactly like our allies in South Vietnam, never appearing in uniform and easily blending into the village life of the countryside. . . . For the GI grunts in the field, it was a grisly nightmare. Think of the soldier "lucky" enough to have his laundry done by a sweet old woman who, after dark, changed into a Vietcong guerrilla, laying mines on the path to the mess hall." Nothing has changed. We are still putting our GI's at unnecessary risk due to presidential delusions. We are still labeling our real enemies (Iraqi's, Saudi's, Pakistani's) as friends -- just to keep that oil flowing. And soon we will be importing thousands of so-called Green Zone Iraqi "friends" into the US when we cut and run. It's fifty years after the Vietnam debacle, and Repubs and Dems are just as clueless as they ever were about the dangers implicit in anti-Western, anti-rule-of-law, cultures and value systems. Now our democracy-sloganeering president has put our soldiers into Iraq, as Nixon said about Vietnam, to "win their hearts and minds." But for the GI grunts, it's a nightmare even more surreal than Vietnam was: This time our clueless military commanders are not only inviting the enemy Shia into the Green Zone to do the GI's laundry and translation, this time they are forcing the naive, young GI's go on patrol with Shia gunmen, who could easily shoot them -- the infidels -- in the back at any moment and in good Islamic conscience. This time the oil-blinded leadership is TRAINING the enemy. | ||
Backfire John Sweet Book review #3 Baritz, Loren. Back Fire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did. Baltimore: The John's Hopkins University Press, 1985. Loren Baritz takes a look at the Vietnam War in a way that lets us understand why we decided to fight and why we fought the way we did. Unlike most surveys of the war that focus on the logistical elements and command decisions which explain what the war was Baritz explains why it was. "To understand our present role in the world" Baritz explains, "we must understand the Vietnam debacle." (p.9) Indeed, if we are to learn anything from our mistakes, and virtually everyone now agrees that Vietnam was a mistake, it is essential to know why something happened and not just what happened. To explain why Vietnam happened the way it did Baritz proposes that there is "an inherent connection between war and culture [that is] present in all nations." In our case, Vietnam was fought the way it was because our culture left us no other way to fight it. Baritz divides the book up into three parts. The first part, Tinder, explains why America decided to fight in Vietnam and the myths that forced us to make war half way around the globe with a people that we did not understand. The second part, Fire, explains how we fell into an ever deeper war in Vietnam and how our means of fighting determined how we fought and why we were unable to effectively combat a vastly inferior military force. The third part, Backfire, is the most telling part of the book for it presents an explanation of how our culture forced us to fight the way we did, why we ultimately lost, and why we are still making the same mistakes today. In Tinder, Baritz convinces us that Americans firmly believe that we are the best. We are a "chosen people" inhabiting a "city on a hill" doing "Gods work" bringing a "Great Society to Asia." Such blatant solipsism is part of our entrenched American dogma. So ingrained is this self righteousness that we truly can not comprehend someone who does not wish to be like us. One GI put it simply "The Vietnamese are so stupid that they can't understand a great people were trying to help a weak people." So it was, as Baritz explains, that Gods Country went to Vietnam to save them. Our almost total ignorance of the Vietnamese culture is now legendary but at the time it did not seem important. Our sense of righteousness and invincibility was so complete that we never even considered the possibility that we were the real enemy to the South Vietnamese. One of the greatest blunders of the Vietnam War was the refusal to see the indigenous forces of the South as the main target. Instead, we assumed that the North was behind our failures to win the hearts and minds of the "backwards" South Vietnamese. Baritz is careful to explain that all nations have myths about their own greatness, but it is when these myths of inherent superiority are combined with power that terrible things happen. As was the case for us in Vietnam. Indeed, Baritz's book is now routinely quoted to expose the similarities between Vietnam and Iraq in an attempt to put the brakes on what is turning out to be a similar debacle. Our moral superiority has often been derived by our technical superiority according to Baritz. Our obsession with the power of technology is absolute. It has been, and is today, the firm belief of most Americans that technology is the answer for most problems. This dependency on technological solutions, according to Baritz, blinded us to the proper response in Vietnam which was counterinsurgency. To truly win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese, intelligence and human interaction, practiced on a national scale might have handed the US a victory. But such a strategy offered no stage to display our superior technology. Even when our use of technology was obviously not working the Army responded in a typically American way. "When something failed to work we did more of it."(p.233) While such insanity is self-evident today, at the time it was perversely logical to the American generals who were so caught up in their own myths that to do otherwise would be tantamount to admitting the entire American way of life was wrong. After reading Backfire the belief in American military strategy as an extension of what is essential about America is not such a slippery slope. Baritz is very convincing connecting American culture to the way we fight. We are a technological nation and, more than anyone, dream of winning wars by the push of a button. "Shock and Awe," "smart bombs," and "stealth" are all extensions of our desire to separate us from harm and have the wonders of American ingenuity save the day. In Vietnam, as well as in the war on terror, where there is no front line intelligence gained from good foot soldiers and not bigger and better missiles are the deciding factors in achieving victory. If all of this is so clear now why do we continue to make the same mistakes? In the third part, Backfire, Baritz explains that we have no choice. We fight the way we do because our culture defines who we are and how we fight. As long as our culture remains the same we will continue to be more efficient in our fighting but no more effective. This is because we are prisoners of our faith in technology. In order to maintain a high tech society the functioning of government, business, and the military must reside in a bureaucracy. As Baritz explains "when the technological mind is turned to the problem of organizing human activity, the result is bureaucracy." (p.48) Baritz demonetization of the effects of bureaucracy on the military is total. With clarity and logic he explains how the fighting of such a technological war necessitated the bureaucisation of the military and its tragic consequences. The most damning of the outcomes is the development of careerism within the officer corps. The shift of officers from "leaders to managers" created such hazards as a drop in morale, insubordination, lack of responsibility, lack of experience, and unimaginative tactics. When officers are working to "get ahead" the job takes precedence over the mission and the mission suffers as it did in Vietnam. The combination of bureaucracy and technology in Vietnam led to the eventual, extreme conclusion in strategy, that of having no strategy; the body count. When killing becomes and end unto itself the morality of war breaks down quickly. War becomes cold and passionless. Baritz correctly finds fault with such thinking claiming that "passion is an appropriate response to war." Without passion and debate the bureaucratic ship will be on autopilot. Incidences such as My Lai are the tragic results. Did we learn from Vietnam? Baritz claims that "one antidote for folly is experience" and the experiences of Vietnam should have cast our invincibility myth into the ashcan as well as our reliance on technology as a panacea. Yet, it seems that the lessons of history are nothing in comparison to the American Myth that we are a city on a hill. Ronald Reagan against the Soviets, Clinton against the third world and the Bush Doctrine of preventive strikes and the forced spread of democracy all have repeated some of the mistakes that we made in Vietnam. Baritz concludes that "our power, complacency, rigidity, and ignorance have kept us from incorporating our Vietnam experience into the way we think about ourselves and the world." (p.349) To fight a different, more humane, more effective war, will require more than a change in the military structure but a change in American cultural thinking. Looking at the current global policy of the United States, this does seem likely to happen any time soon and so we will continue to fight the way we do: with a national myth that shows us that we are good, with technology that makes us strong, and a bureaucracy that gives us standard operating procedures. Unfortunately, it has proven not to be a winning combination. | ||
Too bad it didn't get read by our leaders I can't add to the description of the book, except to say that it's too bad more people haven't read it. Especially our leadership. It's horrendously important to recognize the failures that we're repeating in Iraq. | ||