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 | | Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life by Daniel Dennett ISBN-10: 9780684802909 ISBN-10: 0-684-80290-2 ISBN-13: 9780684802909 ISBN-13: 978-0-684-80290-9 Hardcover 1995-05-10 Simon & Schuster Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Product Description Offers a wider perspective on Darwin's scientific theory of natural selection, explaining how it extends beyond biology, analyzing current controversies over the origins of life and inherent biases, and challenging popular philosophies. 35,000 first printing. Tour. | ||
Amazon.com Review One of the best descriptions of the nature and implications of Darwinian evolution ever written, it is firmly based in biological information and appropriately extrapolated to possible applications to engineering and cultural evolution. Dennett's analyses of the objections to evolutionary theory are unsurpassed. Extremely lucid, wonderfully written, and scientifically and philosophically impeccable. Highest Recommendation! | ||
Reviews | ||
A philosophy book that stuff scientists (like me) can get behind Dan Dennett manages to achieve a great deal in a relatively short book. Through a series of insightful, clever though experiments and self-referential terms the author manages to allow the reader to think about evolution, morality and the meaning of life in unique ways. That is one of the great strengths of the book is that the author uses these techniques to allow us to rethink and reformulate some stale ideas in more vivid ways. I haven't read many books by philosophers and I must admit that the writing style and the literary focus were a bit disorienting. But once I understood the types of issues and problems that were important to philosophers I began to appreciate this world. Plus, this was a philosophy book about a topic I am well read on and very interested in, namely evolution. Dennett does a good job of writing a philosophy book that can appeal to a wider audience. Dan Dennett effectively builds up a whole world for the purposes of this book. Unless you are willing to follow him in his quirky thought-processes you won't get far. He defines several terms (design space, greedy reductionism, cranes and skyhooks) and then effectively uses this new dictionary to discuss his thoughts. If you are willing to follow him, you are in for a treat. | ||
A good, but overly scientific, introduction Dr. Dennett's work is a good introduction to the idea of evolution and its resultant consequences. As a Catholic theologian-in-training, I found his discussion on the moral and ethical implications of evolution lucid and well-argued. Getting to that part of the work, however, was an issue. Having had difficulties in science courses in school, I found his scientific discussions of the Tree of Life, among other subjects, to be something that must be slugged through. On the whole, I give Dr. Dennett high marks for examining the theory of evolution with an objective and logical eye. While his opinions and viewpoints are not absent from the text, they are most often supported with logical or scientific evidence. Though it does get mired in scientific language, I recommend this book to those that wish to better understand evolution and its consequences. | ||
Not for philosophers I think Dennett is a smart guy and he's written some impressive arguments in favor of wild theses (like for instance there being no qualia), but this book strikes me as an obvious attempt to write a bestseller. It's filled with quotes from Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould et. al. (people who have written bestsellers). It also isn't particularly polite, nor all that impressive. On the other hand, it's well researched and rather informative. The book purports to be about Darwin and evolution but really it's a catch-all defense of scientific materialism. Basically Dennett calls any attempt to argue against scientific materialism the search for a "skyhook"...a rope extending from the sky on which to prop up an otherwise doomed theory. He contrasts this with the notion of a "crane"...a hook that extends from up high somewhere, but is ultimately attached to and supported from the ground. This is a useful distinction when it is first introduced, but the term "skyhook" becomes in practice a derogatory one, used without distinction to disparage both would-be spiritualists and reputable thinkers trying to deal with scientific materialism's well known shortcomings (e.g. consciousness, which Dennett ignores completely here). Most annoying of all, Dennett uses rather rude language to describe what he takes to be unthinkable mistakes in some of the theories of a few genuinely elite thinkers grappling with major issues, while in these same pages being guilty of some fantastic gaffs of his own on mundane matters. (For example, he uses the word "howler" to describe some ideas that I don't find all that ridiculous at all; for a real "howler", check out Dennett's argument for mitochondrial Eve on page 97.) Examples: ten pages into this book, Dennett takes a swipe at what he calls "John Locke's conceptual paralysis", referring to this: "For it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being...." Locke wrote that. Maybe Locke was right, maybe he was wrong. But, on some readings of "thinking intelligent Being", that evolution by natural selection is an unassailable fact has got nothing whatever to do with it. It's a theory about matter in motion. If you think a theory about matter in motion can explain the origin of mind, then you automatically think that mind is nothing but matter in motion. Which is exactly what Locke doesn't think. On the contrary, it is Dennett that has been paralyzed conceptually here. The issue isn't evolution, it's consciousness. Either (1) our brains run programs in which each input determines a unique output, or (2) our brains run programs in which each input determines an array of outputs, phased along a continuum of branching realities, and consciousness plays a role in choosing between the branches (from one perspective, just chooses, for lack of a better word, a branch to follow). Maybe (1) is the case. It might well be. It is a rather unfortunate picture, because it makes minds epiphenomenal, but maybe that's the way things work. You want to trash the argument from design, go ahead. You may just get a universe of anemic design for your trouble. Cling though we may to the dogma of scientific materialism, we can't *know* that (1) is the case--we don't have the programs and not having them, can't check. (Dennett acknowledges as much on p. 237..."Predicting that someone will duck if you throw a brick at him is easy from the intentional...stance; it is...intractible if you have to trace the...neurotransmitters from optic nerve to motor nerve, and so forth." Precisely what you'd have to do to verify (1).) Meanwhile (1) can never explain consciousness (the title of one of Dennett's other books notwithstanding, which should probably be changed to "Consciousness Explained Away" anyhow) and AI has only failures to report. Meanwhile, to discard (2) simply because it seems too wild is to exhibit the sort of pigheadedness Dennett unfortunately attributes to Locke. There are compelling anecdotal reasons for suspecting something like (2). We know from our own case we have minds, and frankly, it's not particularly conceivable that minds could arise solely from the motion of matter (there is a reason we still read Locke, these many centuries on). It makes the fact of our reasoning power, product of natural selection that it is, more plausible. Brains wouldn't have to be so precise to be good to have around. Just having enough complexity at a refined enough level to induce enough sensitivity to initial conditions to lend a lot of variety of output strictly from quantum effects would already be incredibly helpful. (Indeed, it is incumbent on proponents of (1) to demonstrate that the brain isn't subject to quantum effects at all...it's unrealistic that every branch in the tree would yield rational behavior.) Indeed, such brains could even operate efficaciously on principles of *association*. Which, by the way, is still the only plausible mechanism in town, by which I mean, the only mechanism that might plausibly arise by natural selection; it might behoove mind theorists to figure out how to play the game with it. | ||
"DDI" offers Bold and accessible argument In "Darwin's Dangerous Idea," author Daniel Dennett offers a compelling and comprehensive argument for why Charles Darwin's idea of modification by natural selection is "the single best idea anyone has ever had" and why ultimately, it is not "dangerous" in the least bit. He further attests that the idea pervades through all of our existence and appropriately draws evidence in support of his claims from a diverse multitude of fields. Dennett's approach is bold in that he intrepidly challenges some of society's most esteemed and prominent scientists and philosophers. At the end of the book, the reader is exposed to an interesting and aggressive rationale for how natural selection, countering popular thought that it diminishes significance and meaning in life, actually enhances and fortifies the pillars of our existence. One of the most interesting aspects about this book are the metaphors that Dennett creates to strengthen his argument. He describes natural selection as a crane because though mechanical, impersonal, and essentially simple, it functions to build bigger and greater things; importantly, this includes other cranes. Directly contrasting the cranes are skyhooks, which hang from the sky and are used to suspend grandiose ideas in ways that astound us and defy our understanding. They metaphorically represent other ideas that reflect humans' desire to be special and profound. The metaphor, delineated within the first few pages, resurfaces frequently throughout the book to support his claim but primarily to debunk the claims of his opponents. For me, the vivid imagery attached with Dennett's use of these metaphors really helped me understand his presentation of both sides of the Darwininsm/Creationism debate and each of their principle objectives. I regard this as perhaps the strongest and most original aspect in the book. That is not to say that the other metaphor Dennett introduces and uses in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" are insignificant. I was thoroughly impressed how Dennett argued strongly against such prominent intellectuals like Chomsky, Gould, Searl, and Godel by likening their ideas to everyday items with distinct functions such as vending machines, robots, and black boxes. Associating these complex and abstract ideas with tangible and accessible items was essential to my ability to follow his arguments. Regarding the readability, I could easily tell that the book clearly was written for an intellectual and well-read audience. On one hand, I was unfortunate to be relatively new to the topic and failed to recognize some of the references to other works and concepts made; on the other, Dennett noticeable took great effort at attempting to make the book more general-audience friendly through his provision of detailed footnotes. Coupled with the relatively easy prose, I was able to invest myself into the book's arguments though it definitely worked me out mentally. Ultimately, I recommend that "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" is worth a read for the clarity it provides readers on the Darwinism/Creationism debate. The coverage of ideas and topics is so wide that at the very least, readers familiarize themselves with a multitude of modern contentious discussion topics. | ||
Dennett Showing off, Misses the Boat. Dennett has almost managed to do the impossible: antagonize the readers of his explanation of evolution so much that they wish it were not true. I have no doubt that, for many readers, this arrogant and angry man has had that undesirable effect. If you are comfortable being blistered by a school marm, intent not so much on teaching as showing off, this is your book. Dennett brooks no opposition, none. Other writers who support his position, but express it somewhat differently, are vilified. This is done by cagily imputing to the "opponent" motives that Dennett can not realistically know. This is a bloated attack on anyone, including you, the reader, who may not see evolution by natural selection quite the same way as Dennett. Nevertheless, Dennett makes several interesting, and often fascinating points, some excerpted from other authors such as Richard Dawkins. The notion that symmetry is preferable to asymmetry because, in symmetry, each part shares equally in the benefits of neighboring parts, rather than the skew of a few, is stunning; even if it is not so, it is thought-provoking and sounds right. The idea of an unthinkably large but finite, n-dimensional Cartesian space, occupied by accessible organic-genetic-structures, is marvelous. The idea renders imaginable the context in which the most unlikely but achievable connections (selections) can be made, given enough time. (In a remarkable footnote, Dennett criticizes the book written by the Nobel- winning biologist Francois Jacob "The Possible and the Actual," explaining that Jacob did not cover what Dennett thought the title suggested, so Dennett would have to (sigh) cover what Jacob's book should have and did not in [Dennett's] ongoing chapter.) Further, Dennett suggests how this hooking up gets started and expands, under a process that is random but constrained by an increasingly constrained environment (as the combined structures occupy the space and "forced moves," like a dump truck parked in front of a driveway). The logical pitfalls of what could have been described in 250 pages instead of nearly 600 are marked. Dennett cannot refrain from imputing artificial intelligence and computing into his descriptions. His view that natural selection through genes is an algorithm is central. There are many problems with this. The most obvious to me is that the algorithm, as Dennett uses the term, as the effective procedure, was created for speed, pure and simple. Natural selection, on the contrary, is "deliberate" (Dennett's word). The two could not be more dissimilar. Dennett takes delight in introducing mind into a mindless process (evolution). Computing is but one example. He uses up several chapters excoriating Steven Jay Gould on Gould's views of adaptationism. What is adaptationism? It is a way current evolutionists reason about evolution. Hello! What does the reasoning perspective of humans have to do with evolution? Evolution is what it is; and it did just fine before humans emerged at all. Dennett forcefully announces that biology is engineering. So now this mindless process of evolution is marked by planning and specifications and customer design reviews. In fact, Dennett persistently uses the word design in his arguments about evolution by natural selection (design space, et. al.). Dennett abhors the idea of a "Designer," namely God, playing a role in evolution, but he keeps going there. A design is a plan; it expresses intent and provides a blueprint against which the implementation can be verified. Dennett seems to have wanted to write two books: one insisting that God and First Cause(s) play no role in evolution, describing evolution through natural selection in such a way that God could not have played a role. The second book is by Dennett the Geek, who revels in and loves to role around naked in cybernetics and genetics and "etics" of all stripes, memetics included. (The latter book comes across as Richard Dawkins inventing evolution rather than God.) Obviously (or "dead obvious" - one of Dennett's favorite pejoratives) the man could not decide which book to write, so he merged them. I urge readers of this review to acquire and read Darwin's Origin of Species instead of this book. Darwin was not out to impress anyone with his intellect; he did not know of genes, and had he, he would not have ritualized them to the exclusion of all else; and he surely would not have invoked computers to describe the epitome of irregular and languid processes. Further, Darwin is himself a sterling example of how natural selection can achieve "fitness," rather than end in a false start. | ||