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 | | Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays by Thomas C. Schelling ISBN-10: 9780674025677 ISBN-10: 0-674-02567-9 ISBN-13: 9780674025677 ISBN-13: 978-0-674-02567-7 Paperback 2007-09-30 Harvard University Press Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Product Description All of the essays in this new collection by Thomas Schelling convey his unique perspective on individuals and society. This perspective has several characteristics: it is strategic in that it assumes that an important part of people's behavior is motivated by the thought of influencing other people's expectations; it views the mind as being separable into two or more parts (rational/irrational; present-minded/future-minded); it is motivated by policy concerns--smoking and other addictions, global warming, segregation, nuclear war; and while it accepts many of the basic assumptions of economics--that people are forward-looking, rational decision makers, that resources are scarce, and that incentives are important--it is open to modifying them when appropriate, and open to the findings and insights of other social science disciplines. Schelling--a 2005 Nobel Prize winner-- has been one of the four or five most important social scientists of the past fifty years, and this collection shows why. (20060311) | ||
Reviews | ||
Rethread of Old Writings This is an anthology of essays written over the last 60 years and, as with all "greatest hits" products, there are good parts and some stinkers. Overall, Schelling does an excellent job of writing his thoughts in straight forward terms that do not require a doctorate in economics to understand. In fact, he makes several points that everyone could benefit from should know. The first section on "Climate and Society" was an excellent explanation on why the Kyoto treaty is bad for the USA and several ideas on how to use market forces to steer polluting members of industry to greener alternatives. However, the point of using market forces is to get away from the bureaucracy of government regulation of pollution, yet someone will still need to set limits (i.e. total tonnage, number of permits, etc.) in Schelling's proposals. The next hundred pages are full of so much repetition that it's best to just skip before you get so bored that you put the book down and miss the best part. I'll summarize the skipped section: Schelling asks, but doesn't answer the question, whether a person is of right mind under the duress of a strong desire (i.e. Smoking, heroin, etc.) Furthermore, should that person be able to make decisions while not under duress that have effect when under duress (i.e. No matter how much I beg, don't give me morphine when I'm in pain.) As human beings we change our minds all the time, who's to say that under duress is or isn't one of those times. His discussion of the cold war is an interesting perspective that incorporates signaling and game theory. Schelling makes the excellent observation that a buildup of conventional forces in Europe during the cold war was a signal by both sides that they do not intend on using nuclear weapons. Otherwise, nuclear weapons would be deterrent enough of conventional warfare. He also interprets historic events in a nuclear game theory context that may or may not be accurate. Some seem a little to simplistic (or cerebral) to expect politicians to operate in that way. Lastly, the section on "Social Dynamics" is absolutely amazing. I'll summarize, but you should read it for yourself. He created a model that demonstrates even a small amount of preference within two groups will result in a congregation of those like themselves and away from the other another. Thus a reason for how two race/age/sex/experience groups can result in a segregated mapping. My favorite part of the book is when he makes the point that politicians argue, sway and divide the public with value issues and not facts. Very few of us would disagree with an argument that was based on fact. | ||