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 | | Deontic Morality and Control (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) by Ishtiyaque Haji ISBN-10: 0521813875 ISBN-10: 0-521-81387-5 ISBN-13: 9780521813877 ISBN-13: 978-0-521-81387-7 Hardcover 2002-08-26 Cambridge University Press Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Book Description This book addresses the following dilemma: if determinism is true, no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. Prof. Haji concludes by explaining that if no action is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, then our world would be morally impoverished. | ||
Download Description This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right, and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified. | ||
Reviews | ||
a first-rate work This book develops a novel position in the recent debates about the freedom-conditions of moral responsibility. It is absolutely first-rate analytic work on free will, bringing popular recent compatibilist positions into serious doubt! | ||