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![]() | Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) by Julia Driver ISBN-10: 0521781728 ISBN-10: 0-521-78172-8 ISBN-13: 9780521781725 ISBN-13: 978-0-521-78172-5 Hardcover 2001-04-23 Cambridge University Press Find Lowest Price | |
Editorials | ||
Product Description Driver challenges Aristotle's classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues that do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. She argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective that holds that virtue is simply a character trait that systematically produces good consequences. | ||
Download Description The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accounts of virtue which hold that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. Driver argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences. | ||
Reviews | ||
consequentialist virtue theory Virtue theory as disposition consequentialism; clearly written and to the point. If virtue theory is your specialization, you need to read it, but if it's not, you don't. | ||