In "Philosophy and The Good Life" John Cottingham starts with the question: "can philosophy enable us to lead better lives?" In the first section of the book, he chronicles why this challenge to "provide an authentic blueprint for human flourishing", seemingly the most basic of philosophical endeavors, had mostly been ignored in recent philosophical discourse. What an encouraging way for a senior professor of philosophy to start.

In the second section of the book, Cottingham details how classical philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicureans defined the good life as "inextricably intertwined" with rationality. But, Cottingham argues, these thinkers did not adequately address the fact that emotions could obscure the tools of reason or acknowledge the essential role that emotions play in "making us human."

In the third section, Cottingham examines the moral psychology of Descartes, on whom Cottingham has written extensively. First, he notes that Descartes rejected the dominant Aristotelian notion of an ends or teleological based morality, and that instead Descartes argues "we are in the important respects on our own." Next, Cottingham details how Descartes, along with Hume and Kant, became increasingly focused on the anthropology of morality. From this study Descartes came to view the passions as an integral part of the human experience. "Life's greatest pleasures are reserved for "those whom the passions can move most deeply"." To Aristotle's concept of habituation Descartes thus adds the eerily modern notion of a "therapy" for the passions.

The last section of the book brings us fully to modern times. Cottingham addresses modern concerns about the superiority of rationality in ethical discourse, highlighted for example by existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger. To address these concerns Cottingham takes psychoanalysis as a starting point. With psychoanalysis Cottingham wants to find a way to incorporate the tools of reason even if the human psyche does not follow the rules of deliberative rationality assumed by Aristotle, Kant and Bentham in their ethical analysis. He looks to the psychoanalytic process of "recovery and rehabilitation" to better "know thyself." These tools, Cottingham argues, provide a superior way to understand the relationship between reason and passion, and so are necessary elements in following the path to the good life. But, as I said above, this feels to me as if we are left by Cottingham at just the start of the process of discovering the good life.

As a philosophical neophyte, this book was a bit too academic for me, assuming a basic knowledge of the key names in philosophy (Jung, Kant, Descartes) and their systems. Fortunately, however, Cottingham revists earlier conclusions in later chapters, allowing the reader to better grasp the differences between the philosophical systems under review.

Overall, this book is not recommended for those just starting to investigate philosophy, but for those with a basic understanding of the subject may find this book a good overview of philosophy in relation to its goal of helping us achieve a complete life. For me, it was like starting a race in the middle, not knowing where the course had started or where it was going. But this book is interesting enough to encourage me to go back to the starting line to begin a more serious study of philosophy.