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 | | Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore, Thomas Baldwin (Editor) ISBN-10: 9780521443784 ISBN-10: 0-521-44378-4 ISBN-13: 9780521443784 ISBN-13: 978-0-521-44378-4 Hardcover 1993-11-26 Cambridge University Press Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Product Description Principia Ethica is recognized as the definitive starting point for twentieth-century ethical theory. The text is reprinted here with the previously unpublished preface Moore wrote for a planned, but never completed, second edition. Though unfinished, it sets out clearly Moore's second thoughts about his own work. The volume also includes two important pieces from his later ethical writings, "Free Will" and "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," and a new introduction by Thomas Baldwin. | ||
Amazon.com Review It took us thousands of years of struggling with science and ethics before we thought to combine the two. While scientific ethics has advanced only gradually, the science of ethics burst into existence in 1903 with the publication of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica, which did for the study of morality what Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica did for mathematics--clarify old confusions and define terms that are still with us today. Practically overnight, ethicists turned into meta-ethicists, studying their own terms to establish theoretical ground on which to stand before trying to build any prescriptive edifices. Moore begins by clearing up some of the most widely spread confusions plaguing moral philosophy, such as the naturalistic fallacy of Bentham, Spencer, and others who insisted on a precise, concrete definition of good. According to Moore, we have to settle for an intuitive assessment of goodness, and his arguments are powerfully compelling. Proceeding to define terms and territory that have lasted a century, he revolutionized philosophy and single-handedly altered the course of ethical studies for generations. While Principia Ethica isn't the easiest book to read (a dictionary of philosophy comes in handy for most of us), it is well worth careful study by anyone interested in the difference between right and wrong. --Rob Lightner | ||
Reviews | ||
Everything is what it is, and nothing is what it seems Despite its fame, "Principia Ethica" by G.E. Moore is actually a philosophical hoax. It's a long, incoherent rambling which shows that there is indeed something very wrong with a certain kind of modern philosophy. With apologies to Richard Dawkins: "Modern philosophy? Is that even a subject?" Moore makes (or seems to be making - I couldn't always make it out) the following propositions: 1. The "good" cannot de defined in terms of anything else. The good is simply good, and that's the end of it. Everyone who tries to define "good" in terms of something else, commits the "naturalistic fallacy". This is proven by the Open Question Argument. 2. Hedonism is wrong. 3. Aesthetic pleasure and the pleasure of love are good. However, that's not hedonism. 4. We can know that hedonism is wrong. That's a self-evident truth. Such truths are known by intuition. 5. Intuition isn't certain. 6. Right actions increase the amount of good in the world. However, we can never be sure whether an action actually does this. We can only guess. (And remember: the good cannot be defined, and our intuitions aren't certain either.) 7. No action is good in itself. 8. The action of aesthetic contemplation *is* good in itself. 9. None of the above makes any sense whatsoever (admitted by Moore in an unpublished manuscript). *This* is the most famous metaethical text of the 20th century? Gee, what a mindjob. Whaddya say to a thing like that? Perhaps it's best not to say anything at all... Besides, Moore never answers the most important question: Why were people afraid of Virginia Woolf?! | ||
Huh? this book is a staple among the clever clogs chattering classes, even though he mis-spells the word "shown" at least a hundred times. The prose is terrible and I had no idea what he was talking about. Verdict: Ivory tower rubbish. | ||
Nice Version of a Classic Originally published in 1903, Principia Ethica by G.E. Moore is a classic of twentieth century philosophy. Aside from being an influential ethical commentator the author is also one of the founding fathers of the modern analytic tradition. In Principia Ethica Moore consider some of the broadest and most vexing ethical questions. What is the good? What things or actions are good? And how should we live? The book provides a detailed discussion of Moore's so called naturalistic fallacy (the challenge of defining good in any meaningful way). A brief review of the historic context of a work is often helpful in understanding its focus and objective. In the present case Moore is reacting too the broad speculative philosophy popular at the outset of the last century (stemming in significant part from Hegel and his followers). In regard to background reading the first of Scott Soames' excellent 2-volume Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century has a couple of excellent chapters on Moore that may be helpful. Much early analytic philosophy has been challenged. Despite their shortcomings, however, we must admire greats like Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein and their attempts to develop comprehensive philosophical models. In our present era of specialization these types of holistic worldviews are extremely rare. Although there is much of worth is Moore's work, perhaps his most his most enduring observation is that philosophic constructs do not trump common sense pre-philosophic views, e.g. the existence of other minds. I agree with Moore that this is an essential consideration to keep in mind when considering some of the more counter-intuitive philosophical theories Overall, this is a must read for any student. This version is solid, however, the older style print is a minor drawback. | ||
Cornerstone of Modern Ethical Thinking `Principia Ethica' by the very influential Cambridge philosopher, G. E. Moore may easily be one of the very few philosophical works in English written in the 20th century that is widely known outside circles of professional philosophers. The only other works I suspect can fall into this category are Russell and Whitehead's `Principia Mathematica' and Wittgenstein's `Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and `Philosophical Investigations'. Oddly enough these last two works were originally written in German; however their influence has been based almost entirely in the English speaking world of intellect. Moore was very fond of high faultin Latin names for books. This volume was not named after Russell and Whitehead's work, which was published around 1918, but after Isaac Newton's `Principia Mathematica'. Talk about hubris! Being a major influence on Wittgenstein in his early days at Cambridge, he was also the one who suggested the English name for Wittgenstein's first major philosophical work. What is so nice about approaching this work is that its primary thesis can be boiled down to a relatively simple statement. Moore is claiming that statements about good and bad cannot be reduced to statements about facts in the physical world. Those philosophers who claim that you can do this are committing `the naturalistic fallacy' The primary object of Moore's argument is the eminent 19th century British philosopher, John Stewart Mill, whose pamphlet, `Utilitarianism' is one of the four or five most important writings on ethical doctrines, along with Kant's `Groundwork...', Thomas Hobbes `Leviathan', and this work by Moore. Mill's doctrine, refining a cruder statement of Utilitarianism by his mentor, Jeremy Bentham, is that all good must be based on observable pleasure. If there is no way that an action can be traced to the pleasure, it cannot be considered `good'. To be sure, Mill, being an exceptionally smart man, put a lot more into his argument than this statement, but you get the idea from this. Before Moore, Mill's biggest difficulty was the classic dilemma in ethics between `the right and the good'. In many ways, this is the ethical analogue of the dual nature of light, where sometimes it exhibits wave properties and sometimes it exhibits particle behavior. Before Mill, the greatest proponent of a theory of right and wrong was Immanual Kant, who outlined his ideas in his `Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals' and laid out the categorical imperative. Looking at Mills' and Kants' basic principles, you would hardly know they were talking about the same thing, as Mill reduces everything to pleasure while Kant reduces everything to the `good will'. Moore's writings bring him down squarely in the camp opposing Mill, however, his reasoning may not be too familiar to Kant and Hobbes. Moore was one of the founding fathers of what was to become the `ordinary language' movement in Anglo-American philosophy, which was ultimately to be inspired primarily by the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein of Cambridge and John Austin of Oxford. Aside from this `Principia Ethica', Moore's most famous philosophical argument was his defense of common sense when he demonstrated the existence of everyday objects by pointing to first his right fist then his left fist as two examples of real physical objects. One can't appreciate the power of this argument until you try it out in a philosophical argument as I once did in a friend's introductory philosophy class. Moore's naturalistic fallacy says that all statements about good and bad and right and wrong must, when they are reduced to their basic meaning, involve some irreducible statement(s) about duties and right and wrong. There have been philosophers who build whole careers on extrapolating this analysis to fill several books, as in the case of Oxford's R. M. Hare, writing in mid-century under the influence of Austin and Wittgenstein. If Moore's argument has any problem at all, it is in having been trivialized by so many writers taking the same tact by turning doctrines they don't like into `fallacies'. Simply saying something is a fallacy may have enormous rhetorical impact, but it has no substance to it. Being accused of committing the `ad hominom' fallacy of attacking the person rather than the position can really destroy a position, since this is so universally accepted as a mistake. On the other hand, very smart people have claimed that all questions of value are reducible to questions of pleasure. Therefore, Moore must put up a fairly detailed argument to show why Utilitarianism, for one, is wrongheaded because it violates this fallacy, thereby showing that it is, indeed a fallacy. This is a difficult book to read. It is certainly more difficult to read than the average political polemic, but not quite as difficult as Wittgenstein's principle works or of works by European phenomenologists and existentialists after Nietzsche and Kierkegard. But it is well worth the effort! | ||
Modern Ethical Thought Begins With This One! George Edward Moore has the unfortunate privilege of having spawned one of the most uninformedly invoked ideas of all time - the naturalistic fallacy. Like Thomas Kuhn's "paradigm shift," the naturalistic fallacy is tirelessly invoked by writers to mean any number of things, not many of which agree with the author's original usage. That is perhaps one reason to read G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. Another, of course, is that it is a classic of twentieth century ethics! Most of the chapters, of course, deal with Moore's idea about the naturalistic fallacy. Contra those numerous authors that use it to mean simply the fallacy of supposing what is natural to be de facto good (that is one manifestation of it, but not it), the naturalistic fallacy has a much broader meaning. The fallacy, in Moore's view, is to explain what is "The Good" in any way other than to say "it is The Good," - to suppose, that is, that "The Good" is definable in any way. To Moore, "The Good" is simply "The Good" because it is good and that is all we can say. Any attempt to equate "The Good" with something else - pleasure, a metaphysical entity, what is natural, etc. - is a manifestation of the naturalistic fallacy. Moore uses the first chapter to explain why the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy. The answer is similar to Hume's is/ought gap. That is that any attempt to say what "The Good" is - i.e., the Good is what causes pleasure; The Good is what exists in the natural order - is nothing other than a criterion for recognizing things that are good; what explanations of this sort are not are actual definitions of the good. (In other words, saying that things which give pleasure tend to be good is much different than saying that "The Good" is constituted by what gives pleasure and that alone.) Another question that the above definitions can always be met with is WHY pleasure (nature, etc.) are good? In which case, the only real answer - owning to "The Good's" ineffability, is "They just are; it is obvious." The next few chapters (the bulk of the book) is spent trying to prove a negative case - that most ethical theories en vogue suffer from the naturalistic fallacy. Moore spends most of his time on utilitarianism but devotes a good amount also to metaphyiscal theories of the good, also. After the negative cases are made (I found some more convincing than others), he gives a positive case. Here is where Moore is suprising. While he argues that "Good" and "Bad" in regards to ends are factual matters, he is something of a utilitarian in practical ethics - meaning that he sees right conduct as judged by the consequences of the conduct in question. He is also a certain type of relativist who allows that what is right conduct often varies from time to time and situation to situation, as an act performed at one time in one scenario may well have different consequences as the same act performed in a slightly different situation in another time. All in all, I found this book exciting to read. Moore is a clear and engaging writer, and with a few exceptions of repitition, the book was easy and fun to digest. I am giving it four stars despite the fact that I disagree with much of it. While I am prepared to say, with Moore, that "Good" may well be essentially indefinable, I did not see him do anything to try and prove that "Good" was a property of the object, rather than a sentiment of the speaker. And if that is so, then we've no reason to suppose "Good" and "Bad" to be ethical facts of the matter, as opposed to sentiments that different speakers with different intuitions are expressing. Be that as it may, everyone concerned with ethics should read this book. Moore argues strongly for recognition of the naturalistic fallacy and what it means for ethics. Whether you agree or disagree, modern ethics is often a response to this guy. | ||