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![]() | The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It (Contributions in Military Studies) by David M. Toczek ISBN-10: 9780313316753 ISBN-10: 0-313-31675-9 ISBN-13: 9780313316753 ISBN-13: 978-0-313-31675-3 Hardcover 2001-04-30 Greenwood Press Find Lowest Price | |
Editorials | ||
Product Description Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963. The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system. | ||
Reviews | ||
The age old axiom of those who fail to understand history are doomed to repeat it. "The Battle of AP BAC Vietnam" by David M. Toczek (Assistant Professor of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York), is aptly subtitled 'They Did Everything But Learn From It'. On January 2, 1963, the South Vietnamese Army (known by the acronym ARVN) and its American advisers were soundly defeated by Viet Cong Guerrilla forces at Ap Bac. A true military disaster, the American military and civilian leadership failed to perceive its significance and continued to pursue the ultimately unsuccessful policy of equipping and training ARVN troops. A military officer, historian, and academician, David Toczek aptly analyzes the AP BAC operation in detail, while properly placing it within the broader context of the Vietnam War. Toczck persuasively contents that American civilian and military leadership missed a vital opportunity to learn from their mistakes, that not even the structure of the American military advisory system was changed. More than just a superbly researched and written history of a battle in a war now more than 40 years ago, "The Battle of AP BAC Vietnam" needs to be read carefully by today's military and civilian leadership as we are once again engaged in combats in Iraq and Afghanistan against urban and rural guerrilla forces. Otherwise the age old axiom of those who fail to understand history are doomed to repeat it. | ||